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Torts
Wex S. Malone*
Assault - Use of Deadly Weapon Against Intruders
An innocent newsboy who, in the course of making his early
morning deliveries, attempted to retrieve his dog from defend-
ant's residential premises, was shot and seriously injured by
defendant who believed he was a prowler attempting to enter
the dwelling or to molest defendant, his wife, and children.
Liability was denied on the ground that defendant's belief was
reasonable despite the actual innocence of his victim.' The prin-
ciples of law applicable to this situation are fairly simple: ordi-
narily the use of a deadly weapon is not justified for the purpose
of expelling a mere intruder.2 If, however, the intruder is, or
reasonably appears to be, entering or about to enter the defend-
ant's dwelling under such circumstances as to endanger the life
or safety of the occupants and the defendant reasonably believes
that the intrusion can be prevented only by the use of deadly
force, he is privileged to wound or kill.3 Without reviewing the
facts, it is sufficient to observe that in view of the dark hours
during which the incident occurred, the close proximity of plain-
tiff to defendant's window and the established fact that the
neighborhood had been frequently molested in the past, the de-
fendant could properly be found to have reason to believe that
an unlawful and dangerous entry was imminent. However, it is
not so clear from the reported facts that at the time of shooting
defendant was justified in believing that an intrusion or even
the risk of personal danger to himself or to his family could be
prevented only by killing or wounding the apparent intruder.
Defendant shouted a warning, whereupon, according to his testi-
mony, the person "just sort of hesitated and then took off and
ran on a diagonal and through my bush, which is further front
than my window." Defendant shot "within a fraction of a sec-
ond" after warning. Nevertheless, in view of the latitude per-
mitted the trier in evaluating a fact picture such as this and in
the light of the emergency facing the defendant one is not in-
clined to quarrel with the conclusion. But the general tenor of
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Smith v. Delery, 238 La. 180, 114 So.2d 857 (1959).
2. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 79 (1934).
3. Ibid.
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the opinion does leave this reviewer with a very unpleasant im-
pression that the courts might be inclined to sanction the shoot-
ing of any "prowlers, peeping toms, and intruders," or even per-
sons who reasonably appear to be such, to the encouragement of
trigger-happy householders. Conceding that any person should
be permitted to use reasonable force less than deadly weapon
to rid himself of these unwanted persons, yet the wounding of
a human being or taking his life has always been regarded as
a grave matter, particularly where, as here, an innocent boy
will be permanently crippled. Again - and this is no criticism
of the instant decision which represents the majority position-
would it not be better in cases such as this where one of two
innocent persons must suffer, that the individual who resorts
to deadly force for his protection should bear the risk of a mis-
take rather than that the cost of the error should be saddled upon
the wholly innocent victim?
Keeper of Animals
Although the Louisiana courts have frequently announced
the proposition that the owner of a domestic animal is not liable
for injuries inflicted through its vicious propensities except
when he has failed to use "the highest degree of care," it is only
on rare occasions that our courts have faced the problem of the
liability of the harborer of a wild animal. In Vredenberg v.
Behan,4 decided in 1881, the Supreme Court held that all twenty-
six members of a private shooting club which maintained a bear
for several months as a shooting prize were liable without ref er-
ence to fault when the beast escaped and killed a neighbor of
the club. The animal had become enraged when a farmhand
employed by the deceased deliberately set a dog on it in order to
tease it. In imposing liability, the court relied indiscriminately
on both civil and common law authorities. In particular, it quoted
from the opinion in the much-discussed English decision, Rylands
v. Fletcher,5 and resorted to common law torts writers of the
period (Addison on Torts, and Sherman and Redfield on Negli-
gence). The court also threw in the old adage from medieval
law, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, and it summed the
matter up by observing, "The law upon the subject is to the same
effect under every enlightened system of jurisprudence." Despite
4. 33 La. Ann. 627 (1881).
5. Fletcher v. Rylands, [1866] L. R. 1 N.Ex. 265, affirmed in Rylands v.
Fletcher, [1869] L.R. 3 H. L. 330.
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these pronouncements, which would appear to be conclusive, the
Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit recently refused to
impose responsibility upon the harborer of a deer which escaped
and injured a peace officer who was attempting to recapture it.
The intermediate court became convinced that in several court
of appeal decisions 6 subsequent to the Vredenberg controversy
the courts had modified that decision so as to require a showing
at least of slight fault. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court
affirmed its former rule and pointed out that the intervening
cases relied on by the court of appeal related to harms done by
domestic animals. 7 The court might also have directed attention
to the fact that in most, if not all the cases referred to, the
injury was not due to a vicious trait of the animal. In cases
involving the bites of dogs and cats the owner may escape
liability under the Louisiana jurisprudence by showing that he
was not guilty of even the "slightest fault." The same position
with reference to domestic animals at one time prevailed in
France," and this doubtless was the inspiration for the original
Louisiana decisions. The French jurisprudence and doctrine,
however, have changed substantially since that time. Today the
possessor or harborer of either a domestic or wild animal is
fully responsible under French law for harms inflicted by it
without reference to any fault in its keeping.9 Contrary to an
impression that prevails generally in this state, the common law
is more lenient toward the owner of a domestic animal than is
the French civil law, for under the accepted common law rule
the owner of a domestic animal must be chargeable with knowl-
edge of the vicious nature of the beast before he can be held
strictly accountable for personal injuries inflicted by it.,o The
present Louisiana position on domestic animals, which rests
liability upon a showing of at least some fault, is strictly a
hybrid, even though it is arguably preferable to either of the
generally prevailing views. Our decisions, however, imposing
strict liability with reference to the harms inflicted by wild
animals, accord with the law prevailing universally.
6. Willis v. Schuster, 28 So.2d 518 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946) ; Raziano v. T. J.
James & Co., 57 So.2d 251 (La. App. Orl. 1952) (auto struck straying mule on
highway, injury not related to viciousness of animal) ; Thomas v. Wright, 75 So.2d
559 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954) (similar; frightened horse collided with auto on
highway).
7. Briley v. Mitchell, 238 La. 551, 115 So.2d 851 (1959).
8. 2 MAZEAAUD AND TUNC, TRAITit THOBIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSI-
BILITIt CIVILE no 1073 (5th ed. 1958).
9. Id. no 1115.
10. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 57 (2d ed. 1955).
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Traffic and Transportation
Most of the Louisiana cases involving injuries in traffic
rested upon only a dispute of fact. At least two decisions, how-
ever, deserve attention. In Brown v. S. A. Bourk & Sons, Inc.,"
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the proposition that failure to
comply with the mandatory requirements of a traffic law en-
acted in the interest of safety is negligence per se, and it is
actionable negligence if it has causal connection with the ac-
cident. The statute violated in this case was La. R.S. 32 :280,
which requires the provision of a red light upon the tail end of
any load that extends beyond the rear bed of a vehicle. This
provision concededly had not been complied with by the defend-
ant trucking company. The accident involved a rear end collision
with a taxi following the truck and occurred on the Morgan City
Bridge over the Atchafalaya River. In view of the fact that the
tail lights of the truck were illuminated and that the unlit load
of pipes protruding from the rear extended only about eighteen
inches beyond the body of the vehicle, it would seem that the
most difficult issue was as to whether the absence of the statu-
tory light played a causal part in bringing about the fatal ac-
cident.
The Louisiana courts have often had occasion to emphasize
the duty of care to be obeyed by a motorist who, having the
right of way, nevertheless proceeds blindly without regard to
the safety of those who have entered or are about to enter the
intersection from a less favored thoroughfare. 12 Where, how-
ever, a traffic light determines the right of way the situation
of the favored motorist is somewhat different. The driver who
moves with the green light is in general entitled to assume that
the other motorist at such an intersection will not arbitrarily
violate the light. Hence he need not be as cautious as one who
is favored merely by the rules of the road. In adopting this
position the Louisiana courts have absolved the motorist favored
by the light from a charge of negligence (or contributory negli-
gence) in numerous Louisiana cases."i Yet it is noteworthy that
in most instances where this conclusion was reached the accident
occurred at a time after the traffic had been evacuated from the
unfavored street.14 Several times the courts have found that
11. 239 La. 473, 118 So.2d 891 (1960).
12. Comment, 5 LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW 432, 434438 (1946).
13. The most recent of these is Youngblood v. Robinson, 239 La. 338, 118
So.2d 431 (1960), Hamiter, J., and Hawthorne, J., dissenting.
14. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1945-46 Term - Torts
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the favored motorist had failed to use even the "slight care"
required of him when the accident occurred immediately after
the light had shifted and the other party had made the kind
of improper adjustment to the change of light that common
experience shows is to be expected with fair regularity at urban
intersections. 5 Recently, however, the Supreme Court in Bryant
v. Ouachita Coca Cola Bottling Co.,16 faced with a situation of
this latter variety, absolved the driver of the vehicle favored
by the light of any carelessness. The opinion observed that even
under the circumstances suggested above the alleged acts of
negligence by the motorist on the road favored by the light must
have been "most substantial, and they must have been such a
direct factor that without them the accident would not have
occurred." 17
Damages - Death
It has been difficult to determine from cases decided in the
past few years whether the amount of damages recoverable by
a widow for the wrongful death of her husband should be deter-
mined on the basis of her loss of support or, on the other hand,
by reference to community property rights in the wife of one-
half of what the deceased husband would have earned had he
survived to his normal life expectancy, discounted to its present
value.18 Recently in Brown v. S. A. Bourg & Sons, Inc., 9 the
Supreme Court made clear its position that such damages are
based solely upon the loss of anticipated support by the wife,
reduced to its present value. The court also pointed out some of
the factors to be taken into consideration in fixing the loss of
support:
"The life expectancy of the survivor, the divorce rate,
the percentages of remarriage of widows, particularly to
second husbands whose earnings are greater than those of
the first, the condition of the health of the decedent, his
possible retirement, the possibility of an increase or decrease
in his annual earnings, and the change in the value of the
dollar over a long period of years. '20
and Worknen'8 Compensation, 7 LOUISIANA LAW REViEw 246, 247 (1947).
15. Ibid.
16. 239 La. 83, 117 So.2d 919 (1960).
17. Id. at 94, 117 So.2d at 922.
18. See discussion in Comment, 20 LOUISIANA LAW REviEW 357, 360 (1960).
19. 239 La. 473, 118 So.2d 891 (1960).
20. Id. at 484, 118 So.2d at 895.
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